Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 1 (1978) 245-272
@ North-Holland Publishing Company

THE BULLOCK REPORT AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN CORPORATE
PLANNING IN THE U.K. *

PAUL DAVIES

**

I. Introduction
In January 1977 the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (Chairman: Lord Bullock) was published [1]. It is notorious that 'industrial
democracy' is a phrase to which many different meanings can be attached, but the
Committee in its terms of reference was directed to consider only one possible definition: the representation of employees on the boards of directors of the companies
for which they work. Since the Committee was requested by the Government to
report within a year, a strict timetable to which it managed to adhere, a restriction
on the subject-matter of its deliberations was undoubtedly necessary. More seriously, the definition reflected the realities of the political debate about 'industrial
democracy'. The subject had been dragged into the arena of Parliamentary and
general public debate largely through the sponsorship of the Trades Union Congress
(TUC) [2], although other bodies and persons, notably the Commission of the
European Communities and. Mr. Giles Radice, M.P., have taken a hand. Between
1970 and 1977 the Commission has put forward four sets of proposals in different
contexts for the harmonization of the various provisions of the member states for
employee representation and all the proposals have favoured some form of employee representation on a 'supervisory' board [3]. As a member of the European
Communities since January 1, 1973 the U.K. has had to respond to these proposals.
Mr. Radice, at a crucial point, put political pressure on the Government to establish
the Bullock Committee by introducing into Parliament a private member's bill
based on the TUC's proposals [4]. The major, new institutional development proposed by the TUC in order to give effect to its conception of industrial democracy
was a system of employee representation on the board. The Bullock Committee was
required to take into account "in particular" the proposals of the TUC, as well as
experience in Britain, the EEC and other countries.
Surprise has been registered in some quarters that the TUC should have advo*
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cated such a scheme in view of its acceptance of a quite different principle for the
constitution of the boards of the corporations set up in the immediate post Second
World War period, and subsequently, to run the nationalized industries. Under that
system board members are appointed by the relevant government minister for their
expertise and in a personal capacity, not as representatives. Some appointments are
made, of course, in consultation with the TUC, and trade unionists are sometimes
appointed, but they must give up their trade union affiliations if appointed to fulltime posts; part-timers are selected from unions not having membership amongst
the employees of the corporation [5]. This form of constitution was not accepted,
however, without a fierce debate in the trade unions and the labour party where
powerful voices had long ago argued for direct representation of the employees
on the board, especially at the time of the proposed nationalization of the mines
in the early 1920s and again over the 'municipalization' of London transport in
1933 [6]. Those taking this latter view were defeated in the 1930s, but their views
did not lose all appeal and this strand of thought re-emerged in the 1960s in the
rather different context of the democratization of the private sector. Even so, as we
shall see, the TUC has not been able to take all its affiliated unions with it in its
revival of the idea; three large unions - the Electricians' Union (EEPTU), the Engineers' Union (AUEW) and the General and Municipal Union (GMWU) - have opposed the TUC's views to a greater or lesser extent. In consequence, the 1974
Trades Union Congress, whilst accepting the General Council's document, Industrial Democracy, with its proposals for board-level representation, also passed a motion rejecting the mandatory imposition of such a scheme and stressing the importance of collective bargaining.
The Committee, by a majority [7], came out in favour of a system of employee
representation on the board not dissimilar to, though much more refined and articulated than, that proposed by the TUC. Tile evidence submitted to the Committee
by employers and their organizations was unanimously opposed to the TUC proposals, but wavered between outright opposition to any compulsory system of employee representation on the board and grudging acceptance of some minimal
scheme [8]. The minority report, signed only by the three industrialist and banker
members of the Committee, proposed a system of employee representation which
in effect and, one suspects, also in design would be almost meaningless. The strident
employer objections to the majority report, orchestrated by the Confederation of
British Industry (CBI) [9], tended not to find even the minority's proposals acceptable. The main evidence in favour of employee representation came from the TUC
- only unions dissenting from the TUC line gave separate evidence - and from the
Fabian Society [10]. Evidence from other groups, e.g., consumers, also tended to
be hostile to the notion of employee representation.
Some people have regarded the outcome of the Committee's deliberations as
predetermined by its terms of reference [11], which required it to "accept" the
need for a radical extension of industrial democracy in the control of companies
by means of representation on boards of directors and then to "consider" how such
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an extension could best be achieved. In fact, however, the report is not an exercise
in the technical implementation of a scheme already decided upon. It contains an
elaborate justification both for the general notion of employee representation on
the board and for the particular scheme advocated by the majority. The justification of the particular scheme was clearly necessary since the terms of reference,
whilst drawing attention to the TUC proposals, did not require the Committee to
consider them the most appropriate form of representation at board level; the
winning over of all but the industrialist and banker members of the Committee to
a strong form of employee representation was clearly not a foregone conclusion.
More than that, the Committee did not feel itself able to discharge its task without
looking at participation at other levels:
We could not have carried out our inquiry properly, if we had not examined other forms of
participation or if we had ignored the relationship of board level representation to changes
below that level. Nor were those who sent us written evidence constrained by our terms of
reference .... Our report shows that we have interpreted our terms of reference widely [12].

Legislation on industrial democracy was announced by the Labour Government,
elected in 1974, as the third plank in its platform of labour law reforms. The first
stage was to be the repeal of the previous Conservative Government's Industrial
Relations Act, 1971, a piece of legislation much disliked by the trade union movement because of the limitations it placed upon the lawful use of economic sanctions
in industrial conflict and because of its attempts to use trade unions to control
rather than to express the hopes and expectations of their members. It was also a
piece of legislation that had been singularly unsuccessful in achieving these objectives, though it did succeed in rendering all industrial disputes, no matter how
minor, potentially matters of major political and constitutional controversy [13].
The repeal was achieved by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974 and
an Amending Act of 1976, two attempts being necessary because of the Government's initial minority position in Parliament and the opposition of the upper
chamber (the House of Lords, an unelected body). The second stage was to be the
enactment of a positive statute conferring rights and protections upon individuals
(e.g., against unfair dismissal or in respect of trade union membership and activities)
and upon trade unions (e.g., rights to be recognized for collective bargaining purposes or to be given information). This was achieved by the Employment Protection Act, 1975, although the process had begun at least a decade earlier on the individual level.
The third stage of legislation upon industrial democracy remains unfulfilled;
indeed the Government has not produced at the time of writing (December 1977) a
'White Paper' setting out its legislative proposals in response to the Bullock recommendations, even though such a document has several times been promised. Some
people take the view that the Government never intended to legislate on this subject [141, and that establishment of the Committee was merely a delaying tactic.
It is certainly true that support in the Labour Government and among the Labour
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Members of Parliament for such legislation is less than it was for the 1974-1976
legislation, but it is not without strong supporters in both places. It can be said with
,some confidence that legislation to implement the Committee's recommendations
on a general basis seems unlikely in the near future. The Government is again in a
minority position and is dependent upon the support of other parties in Parliament,
notably the Liberals but also in a lesser way the Ulster Unionists, which are not in
favour of the Bullock scheme. Moreover, the Social Contract, a bargain between the
Government and the TUC whereby the latter accepted an extremely restrictive limit
on wage increases (less than what was necessary to keep up with increases in prices)
in exchange for the Government's promotion of certain legislative and administrative measures favoured by the TUC, has after two years of rigorous application
assumed a form in which incomes policy is more a matter of unilateral government
decision than of Government and TUC agreement.
The unlikelihood of immediate legislation does not necessarily reduce the importance of the Bullock Report. As Lord Wedderbum, a member of the Committee,
has said
Of course, this is a debate about tomorrow. The legislation that the government proposes to
introduce, if any, may not be the most important thing; the most important thing will be to
devote sufficient thought now, in the depth of crisis, to the institutions which we envisage as

the right institutions for better economic times and to have plans for legislation now that will

operate then (15].
The Bullock Committee was asked to look only at companies in the private
sector of the economy, although a parallel, internal governmental inquiry under the
chairmanship of a senior Treasury civil servant was set up in respect of the nationalized industries. Ironically, the Bullock proposals seem likely to be tried out first in
those nationalized industries where management and unions wish to experiment
with such a scheme. In the current political climate the temptation to try Bullock
first in a nationalized industry is strong. It enables the Government to do something
partially to implement its pledge on industrial democracy; the CBI is less opposed,
partly because the private sector is not involved and partly because the scheme is
not being applied across the board but only in particular industries. Some unions,
notably the AUEW, whilst opposed to such schemes in the private sector, do not
oppose them in the public sector. An example is the Post Office. The Post Office
Act, 1977 increased the number of seats on the main Post Office board so as to
allow, for a two-year experimental period starting in January 1978, the implementation of a scheme agreed between management and unions. Under the scheme this
board will consist of seven management representatives, seven union representatives, five 'independents' jointly chosen by management and unions from a list put
forward by the Minister and an independent chairman appointed by the Minister.
As we shall see, this is by no means an exact transliteration of the Bullock proposals, because the employee representatives are to be appointed by the unions' central
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offices [16], two of the independents are to be explicit representatives of the consumers, and the Minister retains control of who will be on the list of potential independent members and who will be the chairman of the board. Indeed, the whole
scheme will operate by way of an act of self-denial by the Minister concerned since
he retains the power under the Post Office Act, 1969, to appoint all the main board
members. More fundamentally, if the aim of board representation is the involvement of employees in long-term corporate planning, as will be argued in this article,
the significance of board-level representation in the nationalized industries is less
than it would be in private industry. In the nationalized industries at present it
seems often to be the case that such long-term decisions are ultimately taken in
conjunction with the responsible government Minister rather than by the nationalized corporation alone. It is thus at ministerial level that the employee representatives will need to operate. Contacts between unions and ministers on such matters
are of long standing. The beginnings of their institutionalization can be found in the
coal industry's tripartite planning agreement among Government, the National Coal
Board and the National Union of Miners as well as in the Energy Commission
attached to the Department of Energy [17]. To the extent that unions participate
in policy formulation in this way, the importance of board-level representation is
more formal than real. If, as supporters of the Bullock proposals claim, the report is
"a minimum programme for transition in the direction of a socialization of the
private sector" [18], then its application in the nationalized sector must be at best
a side-show to the debate about the private sector.

2. The Bullock proposals
The Committee had four major problems to resolve: the enterprises to be
covered by its proposals; the composition of the board; the method of selection of
its members; and the need, if any, for changes in the constitutional structure of
U.K. companies or other areas of traditional corporate law.
A. Enterprisesto be covered
The Bullock report favours a scheme of employee representation on the board,
but only in the case of large companies or groups of companies. The report measures size by the number of workers employed, taking 2,000 as the minimum number that would bring its proposals into operation (though the number might be
reduced at a later date). To start with the largest companies seems right since it is
the largest companies that in general have the greatest economic power because of
their relative emancipation from the constraints of the market. Nevertheless, it is a
measure of the concentration of the private sector of the U.K. economy that whilst
only some 738 enterprises employ more than 2,000 employees, some six to seven
million people (about one third of total employment in the private sector) work for
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these large concerns [19], so that the Committee's proposals would in fact embrace
a sizeable proportion of the total working population of some twenty-five million.
Given the propensity of enterprises to be organized, in legal terms, not as single
companies but as groups of companies, it was necessary for the Committee to take
the economic rather than the legal unit as the basis for its proposals. Where an
enterprise is organized as a group of companies and employs more than 2,000
people, then the employees may be represented on the board of the holding company of the group, even if, as is often the case, the holding company employs far
fewer than 2,000 people [20]. Without such a rule there would be a considerable
temptation for enterprises to reorganize their corporate structure so as to avoid
employee representation at this crucial level. Nevertheless, the Committee also
thought it right to retain representation in groups of companies on the boards of
those subsidiaries or sub-subsidiaries which by themselves employed 2,000 employees or more.
Wholesale exemption for subsidiaries would impose drastic limitations on the employees'
ability to influence major decisions; and while representation at the level of the group holding
company board is essential for influence over strategic policy decisions, representation at the
subsidiary level is also of importance if employees are to know they can bring influence to bear
at the level of the company which is their immediate employer [21].

The provision for representation on the boards of subsidiaries caused problems
given the method of composition of the board suggested by the Committee; we
shall have to return below to the question of groups of companies (including multinational groups). What can be said here is that, although it could have been more
detailed, the Committee's report is one of the few places in U.K. literature where
the problems raised for traditional corporate law by groups of companies are recognized and an attempt is made expressly to take them into account in formulating
legal rules.
B. The composition of 'reconstituted'boards
Having decided to take the enterprise as the basic unit, the Committee considered the composition of the new board. On this issue the TUC proposed a simple
half-and-half split between representatives of the shareholders (or of management,
depending on the relationship between the shareholders and management) and the
representatives of the employees [22]. The employers giving evidence to the Committee wanted no more than one thrid of the seats to be taken by such representatives, if they were prepared to countenance employee representation on the board
at all. The report proposes a compromise, albeit one close to the proposals of the
TUC than to those of the employers, by suggesting an equal number of employer
and employee representatives with an additional third smaller group co-opted
jointly by the two larger groups [23]. This third group should always be an odd
number, but also a number greater than one.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol1/iss3/3

P. Davies / Corporateplanningin the U.K.

Since the Committee did not want to specify the size of the board for any particular company (except in default of agreement between employers and employees), it translated its recommendations into symbolic form: the composition of the
board should be 2x +y where x >y > 1, x being the number of employer or employee representatives and y (required to be an odd number) the number of jointly
co-opted third parties. In this way the minimum size of the board would be 11. The
chairman of the board is to have no casting vote, but the report recommends that
the employer representatives continue to provide the chairman unless the whole
board unanimously agrees otherwise [24]. The third (y) group is seen as having two
functions: the positive one of providing "an important means by which special
experience and expertise can be brought into the boardroom from inside and outside the company" [25], though no qualifications for co-option are proposed
beyond acceptability to the majority of both of the x groups. The negative function
is to act as a tie-breaker in case there is a deadlock. It is difficult to make public
proposals for equal representation of employers and employees on a board without
including some mechanism for breaking deadlocks, but it is equally difficult to see
the company being run successfully if a decision by the y group becomes the normal method of resolving problems. It is clear that the Committee thought that
tie-breaking by the y group would be the exceptional case [26]. Further providing
for the pathological situation, the Committee had to consider what was to happen
if the two x groups could not agree on who should constitute they group. The solution proposed is the creation of a quasi-independent government body, the Industrial Democracy Commission (IDC), which in the current fashion would be government funded but controlled by a tripartite council of representatives of the employees and trade unions and others with relevant experience. The IDC would initially
provide conciliation but, if conciliation failed, would itself appoint the y group

[27].
The report considers the question of representation on the boards of companies
associated in groups. A problem with formulating a policy relating to representation
on boards in groups of companies is caused by the combined effect of the proposals
that the y group should be jointly co-opted or appointed by the IDC and that not
only the holding company of the group but also subsidiaries which themselves employ 2,000 employees or more should be subject to the scheme. In at least some
groups the various companies comprising it are treated as a single entity for the purposes of formulating and executing business policy. Such a strategy cannot be pursued unless the holding company can require its subsidiary to adopt the policies
decided upon for the group as a whole. The Bullock proposals create a risk - it is
not clear how large a risk - that the y group and the employee representatives on
the subsidiary's board might combine and outvote the shareholder (i.e., holding
company) representatives. The report accepts the desirability of preserving a
coherent group strategy by proposing that in the case of disagreement about the
composition of the y group on the subsidiary's board the parent company, rather
than the IDC, should have power to appoint they group. The same would apply to
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removal of members of the y group [28]. Of course, the holding company's board
would be subject to reconstitution, since the group as a whole necessarily employs
more than 2,000 people if one of its constituent companies does, though owing to
the optional character of the proposals (discussed below), it may not in fact have
been reconstituted. The policy here has perhaps been best put by Professor KahnFreund, who has remarked: "... the word shareholder has legally the same, but
economically a totally different, meaning when you talk about a subsidiary which is
really no more than a department of a controlling company; for tiis reason the
parent company's will should prevail with what is really part of the same company,
it being assumed, of course, that within the parent that will is formed through the
mechanism of the 2x +y formula" [29].
This ingenious scheme fails, however, where the group is multinational, controlled by a holding company incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction, for there is
rfow no longer the possibility of reconstituting the holding company's board. One
in six or seven of the enterprises employing 2,000 people or more is controlled
from overseas. The problems caused by the lack of fit between multinational corporate structures and national jurisdictions are generally intractable and the Bullock
Committee found no easy solutions. Unwilling either to ignore the need for coherence of policy in multinational groups or to make the employees of foreign multinational companies 'second-class' citizens, the report proposes that, in cases of disagreement, the y group in the top U.K. subsidiaries be appointed by the IDC, but
only after consultation with the foreign parent and the relevant government minister, who would be able to give expression to relevant considerations of foreign
investment policy [30].
C. Selection of employee representatives
Having settled the composition of the board the report turns to the method of
selection of its members, or rather of the employee representatives. The method of
selection of the y group has already been elucidated. It is assumed that the employer representatives will be chosen in the same way as at present, i.e., usually, but
not necessarily, by the shareholders in general meeting. The report does not suggest
a single method of selection of the employee representatives, but rather a method
of determining the method of selection [31].
The decision as to method of selection is to be taken by a 'Joint Representation
Committee' (JRC), a new body to be constituted in each company where the
scheme of employee representation is introduced and to be composed of representatives from all the independent unions (whether white-collar or manual workers'
unions) recognized by the company for the purposes of collective bargaining. The
representatives of the JRC are to be not full-time union officials but rather shopstewards, i.e., employees of the company concerned elected by groups of their
fellow workers to represent them in their dealings with management and accredited
by the union as its representatives in the workplace. The JRC would decide on the
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method of selection of the employee representatives: it might decide to hold a
ballot of the whole of the workforce or it might at the other extreme nominate
the representatives itself. The JRC would in any case have the power to remove
at any time by unanimous decision any of the employee representatives and
would have to conduct the initial discussions with the existing board on the size
and composition of the 'reconstituted' 2x +y board to be introduced. The JRC
would not, however, be free to denominate the universe from which to select the
board representatives of the employees; the report recommends that except in unusual cases the representatives should be employees of the company, though no
other qualifications for selection (e.g., age or length of service) are laid down. The
representatives would not receive directors' fees but, like shop stewards when
engaged in representational activities, would be reimbursed for their expenses and for
loss of earnings (including overtime earnings if board meetings take place outside
their normal working hours) [32].
In very few countries are manual and white-collar workers in an industry organized into the same union, and in the U.K. the principle of union organization on
industrial lines is not in any case the dominant one. Occupational, craft or general
bases of organization are equally often found, so that it may be expected that in a
large company a number of manual and white-collar unions will be found representing different groups of workers. It may also be expected that in both the initial
constitution of the JRC and in subsequent discussions in that body a degree of
inter-union conflict may emerge that will impede the Committee's proposals. The
report does not deal with this problem in detail but rather indicates in a general
way that the problems should be resoluble through conciliation and supervision by
the IDC, coupled in some cases with the threat that failure among the unions to
agree will leave the employees unrepresented [33]. Although the possibility of
inter-union conflict has been mentioned in public discussion, much more attention
has been focused on the principle of placing the selection of employee representatives in the hands of the JRC. It has been suggested that it is undemocratic not to
choose the representatives of the work-force through a secret ballot of the whole of
the work-force, whether members of a union or not, though in fact the density of
union membership in large companies is high (probably around 70%). The decision
to base the method of selection on the trade union machinery, to create a 'single
channel' of employee representation throughout the enterprise, has been defended
on the grounds that "any new system which does not accommodate the organizational function of the shop stewards' committee in the British factory just will not
work" [34].
It should be noted that the principle of the 'single channel' not only reduces the
influence of non-unionists in the process of selection, but also carries with it the
consequence that in the absence of any unions recognized for the purposes of collective bargaining the system of employee representation on the board cannot be
instituted: board-level representation is thus supplementary to collective bargaining.
In this way the Committee signified its acceptance of a point urged upon it by
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nearly all those who gave evidence: changes at board level are not by themselves
sufficient to ensure an extension of industrial democracy, but what is needed is an
inter-related structure of participation at all levels of the enterprise. However,
whereas this led many of those giving evidence to propose the creation, perhaps by
legislation, of a system of 'works councils' at lower levels as a prerequisite to board
level representation, the Committee wished to root its system of representation at
board level firmly in the existing structures of plant-level collective bargaining. The
significance of this is discussed further below in section 3.
The non-unionist, moreover, is not entirely without a say. His say follows from
the optional character of the Bullock proposals [35]. They are not to be applied to
all enterprises employing more than 2,000 employees no matter what the wishes of
those employees. In order for the system to be 'triggered' in any particular enterprise a ballot of the whole of the relevant work-force [36] must first be held and a
majority of those voting, who must constitute at least one-third of those entitled
to vote (a requirement difficult to satisfy), must vote in favour of its introduction.
The non-unionist thus has a voice on the question of the introduction of the
scheme. He has a voice also on the ballot to decide whether the scheme shall continue. A referendum may be held after the scheme has been in operation for five
years or more, though in that case the majority constituting one-third of those
eligible to vote must be against the scheme if it is to cease. However, the value to
the non-unionist of this procedure is reduced to some extent by the fact that the
ballots, whether for introduction or continuance, may be called only by a union
recognized by the company in respect of workers who constitute at least one-fifth
of the work-force. It is clear that the principal purpose of the ballot procedure is not
so much to protect non-unionists as to ensure that in each situation there is a sufficient degree of employee and union support to make the representation scheme
work. In particular, a union opposed to board-level representation would be free to
urge its members to vote against its introduction and would not be obliged to join
the JRC and participate in the scheme even if the ballot was in favour of it.
D. The board, the shareholders'meeting and management
An elaborate debate was conducted, before, during and after the publication of
the Bullock Report, on whether the introduction of employee representation on
the board should be accompanied by the introduction of a 'two-tier' board in place
of the 'unitary' board found in current British law and practice. The debate has
been conducted largely with reference to German law, which has required a two-tier
board for many types of company since the latter part of the nineteenth century,
and which has also required since the early 1950s representation of the employees
on the 'top' or 'supervisory' board. The debate has been characterized by complete
changes of view by both the TUC and the CBI. The TUC originally favoured a twotier system with the employees represented on the top board as a way of keeping
the employee representatives from embroilment in day-to-day management, but
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subsequently opted for a single-tier arrangement for fear that the employee representatives would otherwise be excluded from important decisions. The CBI originally argued against the two-tier system as an undesirable disruption of current
British practice and used this as an argument against any employee representation.
Feeling obliged, however, to propose a scheme of representation to counter the
TUC, the CBI then took the view that such representation should be on a supervisory board.
These changes of view perhaps make it clear that the debate is really about the
powers which the board upon which the employees are to be represented is to have
rather than about one-tier versus two-tiers as such. From this perspective it becomes
equally important to consider not only the desirability of a division of functions
between two boards, but also the relationship between the board and the general
meeting, since the employees are not to be represented in the shareholders' organ.
These problems involved the Committee in consideration of some technical, corporate law problems the nature of which it is perhaps worth sketching [37].
The constitutional structure of British companies under present law usually consists simply of two parts: the shareholders in general meeting who elect the other
constitutional organ, the board of directors, which, in turn, is charged with the task
of managing the business of the company. Although that is the usual system, the
present law does not require that the directors be elected by the shareholders in
general meeting. Since the law gives the shareholders control over the contents of
company's memorandum and articles of association, what the law ultimately provides is that the shareholders have control over the question of how the directors
shall be elected [381. That control is normally exercised so as to provide that the
shareholders shall elect the directors, but it is not unknown for the shareholders to
confer the power to nominate one or more directors upon a non-shareholder, e.g.,
a substantial lender of money to the company.
Equally, the constitutions of most companies confer upon the board the broad
power to "manage the business of the company" because the shareholders have
exercised their control over the cdmpany's articles so as to confer this power upon
the board [39]. It is always possible, although perhaps unlikely, that the shareholders might alter the company's constitution so as to confer a less extensive
power on the board and to keep greater power in their own hands. In such a situation the shareholders' meeting would become a more significant event than it now
usually is. However, the shareholders do not have an entirely free hand to delegate
to the board, for there are a small number of fundamental organic changes in the
company which the present law places wholly and nondelegably within the control
of the shareholders (though the Companies Acts provide in some cases for an appeal
to or confirmation by the courts to protect dissentient shareholders or creditors)
[40]. But with these qualifications one can say that the present constitutional
structure of the British company is a simple two-part one in which the board is the
predominant organ.
Of course, in practice the board cannot by itself manage the business of the com-
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pany. The position of director in itself is only a part-time one. The full boards of
large companies meet on the average only once a month; they must necessarily delegate extensively to the senior management of the company and rely heavily on its
advice. In practice, a variety of patterns of delegation can be found. No doubt this
is partly the reason that the typical board of a large British company is made up
mainly of people who are also senior managers of the company, so that the directors and the senior management are not distinct but rather overlap. This overlap is
personified in the powerful institution of the managing director, who is both the
senior manager and an influential member, sometimes even the chairman, of the
board. Only a minority of the board seats, on the average a third, are held by nonexecutive people [41]. In spite of this it is crucial that in legal terms the extent to
which the board delegates to senior management is a matter for the board alone to
decide. If a board wishes to control rather tightly the company's business, especially, say, its strategic planning, there is no legal obstacle to its doing so. Indeed
the CBI has recommended that the setting of corporate strategy always be a board
function [42].
The Committee contrasted the U.K. system with the two-tier system found in
Germany. Leaving aside for the moment the question of how the employees are
represented within this structure, the first point to notice is that the constitutional
structure of German companies is tripartite. It is tripartite, in contrast with the
English bipartite structure, because-there are two boards. Although the shareholders
in general meeting elect the supervisory board, the members of the managingboard
are not elected by the shareholders, but are appointed by the supervisory board.
Moreover, the members of the supervisory board are wholly non-executive, and the
membership of the managing board is wholly executive. Now at first sight all that
the Germans have done is to formalize the distinction between the executive and
non-executive members of the unitary British board, and to separate the executive
members into a separate corporate organ, the managing board. However, there is a
vital further factor that must not be overlooked: whereas, under the U.K. system,
the division of powers between the board (containing executive and non-executive
members) and senior management is a matter for the board itself to decide (and
most management theory recommends that the board itself should keep control of
strategic planning), under the German system the law determines the division of
powers between supervisory board and managing board. Moreover, in Germany that
division in fact places policy creation as well as policy execution in the hands of the
managing board and leaves the supervisory board with, as its name suggests, almost
wholly supervisory functions (apart from the power, exercisable every five years in
the usual case, to appoint or re-appoint the members of the managing board) [43].
A comprehensive description of the German system would have to qualify this
picture to some extent, but the Committee thought it sufficiently accurate to conclude that a German-style system in the U.K. would increase the risk that the board
on which the employees were represented would become "a reactive and passive
body, meeting three of four times a year to hear reports from management" [44].
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It does not follow that in a two board corporate structure one must adopt the particular division of powers found in the German system. One could have a different
division, giving a greater role to the supervisory board and therefore making employee representation on the supervisory board a more significant matter. The
Danish system, discussed by Bullock, provides an example of something along these
lines [45]. However, that system, which also permits both executives and nonexecutives to be seated on the supervisory board, is so like the U.K. system (except
that in the U.K. senior management of itself is not dignified as a separate corporate organ) that little would be gained, except unnecessary complication and
confusion, by introducing the Danish system into the U.K. Nevertheless, the Danish
example does serve to demonstrate that the crucial question is perhaps not one-tier
versus two-tiers, but the functions of the board upon which the employees will be
represented.
However, the introduction of employee representatives onto the existing unitary
board would not in itself guarantee them an effective say in corporate decisionmaking, and so the Bullock committee went further and recommended that the
board have certain 'attributed functions' [46]. This was necessary for two reasons.
First, we have seen that the extent of the board's power to manage the business
of the company depends on whether the shareholders through the company's constitution have conferred this power upon the board and whether the board has
retained this power itself or delegated it to senior management. Obviously, under
the new scheme, employee membership on boards could be rendered totally ineffective if the board's powers were to depend upon what the shareholders decided.
Although some delegation from board to senior management is desirable, the board
must retain control of strategic planning if employee participation is to be at all
effective. The Bullock plan therefore suggests that in certain areas the board should
legally have responsibility for decision-making, whether the shareholders wish to
confer such responsibility on it or not. These areas are the appointment, removal,
control and remuneration of senior management, the allocation or disposition of
resources (including the payment of dividends), changes in the company's capital
structure, and the disposition of substantial parts of the undertaking. In addition,
the board should be unable to delegate its responsibility to review management in
the specific areas mentioned.
The second reason why the Bullock Committee needed to recommend attributed
functions was that the present law requires certain fundamental decisions to be
taken by the shareholders alone. The shareholders cannot confer these decisions
upon the board, even should they want to. This again may be inappropriate for a
company where the employees are represented only on the board. Consequently,
the Committee proposed that in some of these areas the power of initiative should
lie with the board, although shareholders should retain a veto right. The decisions in
question are: the voluntary winding-up of the company, alteration of its memorandum and articles, and certain changes in its capital structure, e.g., a reduction or
increase in authorized share capital.
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E. Directors'duties
Thus at the end of the day the Committee's recommendations on changes in corporate constitutions are relatively modest. The existing unitary board structure
could be retained. The concept of attributed functions of the board did mark an
important theoretical break with one of the major influences of partnership principles upon British company law [47] because it involved use of the law to prescribe
the basic division of functions among shareholders, board, and management rather
than leaving these matters to the shareholders and directors themselves to decide.
However, the substantive content of the proposed attributed functions would
merely ratify what is in practice the common position of dominance of the board
and retain for the board certain basic decisions that management literature generally asserts to be decisions the board ought to take.
The same conclusions can be drawn with respect to the report's recommendations on the legal duties of directors. Here too a major theoretical change is needed,
because the duty of directors to act in the best interests of the company is currently interpreted as requiring them to act in the best interests of the shareholders:
the shareholders, the members, are the company [48]. However, the employees'
interests can be taken into account insofar as it is necessary to do so to further the
shareholders' interests. Since the directors may have regard to the shareholders'
interests on a long-term as well as on a short-term basis and since the formulation of
what the shareholders' interests are is seen by the law as a matter for the directors,
not the court, to decide [49], it is sometimes argued that directors may, and in fact
do, take the employees' interests into account to a considerable extent, at least
where the company is a going concern, with the result that independent legal recognition of the employees' interests as an object of concern by directors would not in
practice be significant. The report, however, recommends such independent recognition of the employees' interests. This recommendation has generally been
regarded as non-controversial, since it follows a similar proposal in the Conversative
Government's Companies Bill of 1973 [501 (which was not enacted because of the
change of government in 1974). From another point of view, of course, this recommendation can be seen as containing the germ of the whole employee representation structure: if the duty of directors to advance the interests of the employees
is once admitted, should not the employees have power equal to that of the shareholders to secure the discharge of that duty [51] ?
With regard to other aspects of directors' duties the report recommended only
minor changes, viewing the rules on secret profits, insider trading, etc. as appropriate for application to all directors, no matter how selected. The committee does,
however, recommend the enactment of a statutory statement of directors' duties
which at present have to be deduced from the judges' decisions [52]. The report
also recommends no reform of the rules about confidentiality, a controversial topic
because the rules themselves are not very clear and management fears they will not
be strong enough to prevent disclosure of damaging information whilst the unions
fear they will hinder reporting back by employee representatives to the JRC.
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3. The rationale of the Bullock proposals
The proposals of the Bullock Committee have been set out in some detail above.
This section attempts to explain the theory underlying the proposals. It will be
argued that the motivation for both the TUC's and the Committee's proposals is
to be found in what these bodies considered to be a deficiency in the scope of collective bargaining arrangements in the U.K., and that the purpose of these proposals
is to fill that gap. The gap has two aspects: it is partly a question of the level at
which collective bargaining takes place and partly a question of the subject matter
of collective bargaining.
A. Level of bargaining
As to level, in the U.K., as in most Western European countries, national level
collective bargaining in each industry was established in the early part of this
century, especially in the period immediately after the First World War, when the
Whitley Committee's recommendations to this effect were enthusiastically supported by the Government [53]. The parties to these bargaining arrangements were
typically, on the one hand, the unions having membership amongst the workers in
the industry and, on the other, the employers operating in the industry, usually
united in an employers' association. Under the impact of the Whitley recommendations the national level bargaining machinery often took the form of a 'Joint Industrial Council', a permanent body with its own small secretariat, consisting of representatives of both employers and trade unions. National level bargaining came
under some strain during the depression of the 1930s but in 1965 the Ministry of
Labour reported the existence of some 500 pieces of negotiating machinery at
national level, covering some eighty-five per cent of manual workers and fifty-five
per cent of white-collar workers [54].
In more recent times national level bargaining has been supplemented in two
directions. First, in a way again paralleled in other western European countries,
there has been the development of 'supra-industry' bargaining, of the type characterized by the Social Contract negotiations noted above, i.e., bipartite or tripartite
bargaining among the government and the central organizations of the trade unions
(TUC) and the employers (CBI). Such bargaining is still a tender shoot whose ultimate stature is in doubt, but whose growth is not. Second, there has been the development within plants of what is usually called 'domestic' bargaining. Such bargaining is usually carried on, not by the full-time union officials who conduct
national bargaining, but by shop stewards. In those plants where domestic bargaining is extensive there will be a hierarchy of ordinary stewards, leading stewards and
convenors, the latter often being engaged full-time on their representational activities, though still paid by the company. Domestic bargaining is often of a much less
structured kind than national bargaining and its reform has been an object of
government policy in recent years [55]. For present purposes, however, only two
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points need be noted. First, in the U.K. domestic bargaining has filled the vacuum
which in many European countries was filled in the early post-war period by legally
required works councils, usually based on a model of cooperation rather than conflict with the employer. For this reason proposals to introduce works councils into
the U.K. on a European model are inappropriate, even though they are regarded
as a crucial element of the structure of industrial democracy in a number of European countries. Second, although domestic barga.ining is well developed, bargaining
at company or enterprise level is much less so. Some companies, usually multinational companies not federated to an employers' association, have encouraged it;
but where they have not 'combine committees' of shop stewards from all the different plants of a company or group of companies have usually failed to receive recognition from the enterprise. Hence the gap in terms of the level of bargaining [56].
B. Subject matter of baigaining
Equally important is the gap in terms of subject matter. It is the common experience of all countries that employers' association are prepared to move only at a
pace which its marginal members can stand, and so national level bargaining tends
to be limited, both in terms of the level of settlement but also in the range of matters subject to bargaining. The tendency to a limited subject matter is reinforced by
the difficulty of settling at national level matters that require detailed consideration
of particular plants or even jobs, e.g., the setting of piecework rates. However, it
has been the experience of the U.K. that even domestic bargaining, although covering a much wider range of matters than national bargaining, has not developed
much beyond decisions directly about employment matters. Shop stewards may
bargain about working conditions (including the distribution of work, manning
levels, transfers, the introduction of new machinery), discipline, lay-offs and so on
[57] but rarely about investment, the location of plant, pricing, product diversification and all the other matters that may be included under the heading of strategic
corporate decisions.
No doubt such decisions have traditionally fallen outside the range of the employees' interests, but a labour movement in the U.K. that has become increasingly
self confident over the past thirty years was bound sooner or later to appreciate the
inter-dependence of all areas of managerial decision-making. Stirrings of interest in
this direction were further prompted by the poor investment record of British
industry and the onset of recession in the 1970s when the limitations became clear
of bargaining about the terms upon which employment was to be offered without
being able to bargain about whether the jobs would be available at all. One can see
how level and subject-matter coincide, for strategic planning decisions are taken at
corporate level: the need was thus "for workers' participation in the formulation of
entrepreneurial policies at enterprise lever' [58].
This line of argument does not necessarily lead to the notion of employee representation on the board; indeed, it rather suggests an extension of collective bar-
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gaining. The reason for not advocating such an extension can be found in a remark
by Professor Mancini which has gained a certain vogue in the U.K.: "The fact
is that collective bargaining can do a lot but it cannot do everything" [59]. The
reason why collective bargaining cannot do 'everything' lies principally in the
nature of the sanction available to the union in such bargaining. In traditional
collective bargaining it is ultimately the union's ability to make a credible threat
of industrial action that moves the employer towards the union's position. Equally,
the threat of loss of pay if industrial action is taken is what moves the employees
towards the employer's position. But does the union possess a credible threat of
industrial action when it bargains over corporate planning decisions whose precise
impact on the work force and, more important, whose impact upon any particular section of the work force may become clear only in the long term? It is an
open question whether the level of consciousness among many groups of British
workers is sufficiently high that they would be prepared to contemplate the possibility of industrial action, with its certain, immediate costs, over issues of longterm planning. This might be thought to be the fundamental problem of the collective bargaining route. It is, of course, a problem that the Bullock proposals
solve very simply by creating an institutional position of power on the board as
an optional alternative to industrial action.
In a sense, employee representation on the board in this context constitutes the
carrying on of collective bargaining by other means. Board level representation is
not a radical break with the processes of collective bargaining but rather the expression, through alternative institutional means, of the principle of joint regulation of
decisions by employers and employees wich underlies collective bargaining. It is
significant that the TUC's proposals for employee representation on the board were
put forward in documents that also proposed the extension and improvement of
traditional collective bargaining. Nevertheless, one major union (the GMWU) has
opposed the Bullock report, not because it objects in principle to joint regulation
of corporate planning in the private sector, but because it believes that traditional
collective bargaining is the appropriate way to achieve this end. Unlike many who
take this view, the GMWU has put forward a scheme for the practical extension of
collective bargaining, but it must be said that this writer does not believe that the
proposals solve the problem of the sanction [60]. In particular it is difficult to
envisage the effective operation of a duty to bargain in good faith over corporate
planning decisions. Nevertheless, the optional character of the Committee's proposals gives unions which take this view considerable freedom to opt out of boardlevel representation and to explore other methods of joint regulation or, indeed,
to leave managerial control in this area intact.
Naturally not every scheme of employee representation on the board can fulfill
the purpose of extending joint regulation to corporate planning decisions. Indeed,
it is the underlying principle of joint regulation that explains the particular scheme
proposed in the report. Parity representation of employers and employees is a
necessary adjunct of the principle of joint regulation especially since all who have
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studied the question seem to agree that minority representation does not bring
about a shift in the balance of power [61].
Basing the representation scheme upon the trade union machinery constituted as
a JRC also follows naturally from the view of board4evel representation as an
extension of collective bargaining: those who engage in collective bargaining at
plant level, i.e., the shop stewards, should also control enterprise level negotiations
so as to avoid institutional rivalries and to ensure smooth communications between
the two levels of activity. The non-unionist is in a telatively uninfluential position,
but no more so than in normal collective bargaining, and the supplementary nature
of board-level representatiorl as an extension of collective bargaining naturally
presupposes a substructure of plant-level bargaining upon which enterprise level
participation is to be constructed.
Finally, an elaborate concern with the powers of the board on which the employees are to be represented is necessary if the Committee is to ensure that the
representatives will in fact participate in corporate planning decisions. From this
point of view the surprising thing is not that the report makes recommendations
about attributed functions but that these recommendations are not more radical.
The subjection of certain of the attributed functions of the board to the shareholders' veto is a compromise in principle with the notion of joint regulation,
though in practice it is likely to be less significant [62]. Vis-d-vis management it can
be questioned whether the rather limited attributed functions of the board,
designed to preserve the freedom of companies to arrange managerial structures
according to their own perceptions of their needs, will in fact be enough to prevent
the board from becoming the mere supervisory body that the Committee wished to
avoid.

4. A critique of the Bullock proposals
As has been indicated, the Bullock Committee's proposals aroused enormous
controversy when they were published, though the controversy has become muted
with the realization that general legislation to implement them is not imminent.
Indeed, political exigencies are currently pushing the Government towards legislation on employee share-ownership schemes rather than on employee board representation [63]. In this concluding section a few of the more fundamental issues
that have emerged in the public debate will be examined.
The first point to make is how relatively uninfluential foreign systems of boardlevel representation have been in the public discussions, as have the proposals of the
Commission of the European Communities. This is not for lack of knowledge of
these systems. The Committee was directed by its terms of reference to have regard
to foreign experience. It commissioned two reports, one by a sociologist and the
other by a lawyer, which assembled and analyzed the evidence about that experience [64]. Foreign systems, notably those in Germany, Sweden and Denmark, are
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discussed at some length in the Committee's report. Nevertheless, although nine
Western European countries have schemes of board-level representation in operation, with the possible exception of the German Codetermination Act of 1976,
which is not yet fully operational, only one scheme was based upon the principle
of parity (so crucial to the Bullock proposals). That was the one introduced in the
immediate post-war period in the German iron, coal and steel industries [65]; the
rather special circumstances of its introduction and development perhaps do not
make it a very useful model for the U.K.
The basic point is that none of the foreign schemes appears to have been introduced for reasons in any way analogous to those which, it has been argued above,
underlie the Bullock proposals. Although it may have been useful to examine the
foreign systems to establish that point and although examination of foreign systems
provided the Committee with a series of questions that needed to be answered
about its own proposals, neither the report itself nor any informed contributor to
the public debate has treated any of the foreign systems as a model for adoption in
the U.K. [66]. The same is true of the EEC proposals, of which it is perhaps not unfair to say that they seem to be more concerned with producing a formula within
which the increasing number of rather different national schemes can be contained
than with the substantive reasons for employee representation on the board, except
as a symbolic matter.
The argument from collective bargaining, deeply rooted in British industrial
relations, has convinced some people that not only is foreign experience of little
value but also that the whole issue is 'really' one of labour law, not of company
law. Although the report considers some difficult areas of modern company law, it
is true that these corporate law issues are mainly technical, arising as consequences
of the choice of the principle of joint regulation rather than contributing to the
debate about that choice. Nevertheless, in a more fundamental way the report challenges the whole basis of our present company law, by posing the question: what is
the company and for whom is it to be run?
If one is satisfied to justify the current structure on the traditional lines that
"the ultimate authority and control over a company [must] rest with those who
provide the capital" [67], then the report's challenge can be easily met. Little of
the evidence presented to the Committee, however, took such a fundamentalist
line. There was considerable agreement that directors ought to take independent
account of interests other than those of the shareholders, though this did not often
lead to the further conclusion that employees ought to be represented on the
board. The concept of an independent senior management mediating among the
various interest groups seemed to be the preferred picture. Even so, the underlying
models of the corporate enterprise in the submissions of evidence, in the report
itself and in the subsequent public debate have rarely been expressly articulated
[68]. This lack of a theoretical perspective has probably done more to hinder management opposition to the proposals than union promotion of them. The TUC
effectively seized the initiative with its proposals of 1973 based on the need to
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make large companies more responsive to the needs of society in general and of the
employees in particular, whilst opposition by employers has tended to throw doubt
either on the bona fides of those supporting such proposals or on the practicability
of their schemes. Objections on grounds of practicability are, of course, very important, but they do not directly address themselves to the question of the underlying
rationale of private enterprise, implicitly raised by the report.
The more fundamental issues have tended to be'raised in discussions within the
labour movement. Particularly at issue is whether the report assumes in its proposals a unity of interest betweerr employers and employees in contrast with the pluralistic model of a conflict of interest that is usually thought to underlie collective
bargaining. The GMWU preference for joint regulation of corporate planning
through an extension of collective bargaining seems to be based upon this contrast,
and the requirement that all directors (including employee representatives) act in
the best interests of the company has been the focus of criticism, even on the basis
of a redefinition of the interests of the company which puts shareholder and employee interests on an equal basis [69]. Professor Kahn-Freund has argued that the
'interests of the company' must always be identical with an interest of the shareholders but may be opposed to all interests of the employees [70]. The proposition
seems to be tenable only on the basis that the sole legitimate purpose of the company is to maximize profits, for actions taken towards this end will always be
intended to benefit shareholders, either by way of increased dividends or by way of
capital appreciation of their shares. Once this assumption is relaxed and it is
accepted as legitimate for those in control of a company to pursue other goals as
well as the goal of 'making profits' (as distinguished from 'maximizing' profits),
then it seems clear that the controllers may take action in a particular case which
may properly be described as "in the interests of the company," but which is not,
of itself, in pursuance of any interest of the shareholders [71]. Today, there seems
to be no mechanism which will guarantee continuous, profit-maximizing behaviour
on the part of the controllers of large companies. Neither shareholder control
(whether by institutional or private shareholders), the forces of market competition, the market in corporate control via takeovers, nor the threat of liquidation
seem for various reasons to be sufficient to impose upon corporate managements
the discipline of profit maximization. There is consequently vested in such managements, in fact if not in law, an element of discretion - the degree of which varies
from case to case - in the setting of corporate goals. One of the main purposes of
employee representation on the board is, of course, to secure effective influence for
the employees in the exercise of that discretion. This is not a development which
those who favour a return to the discipline of profit maximization would see as
particularly helpful; but those who regard nineteenth century models as inappropriate tools for developing policy in regard to mid-twentieth-century capitalism will
not take the natural dominance of the shareholders' interests as an obvious starting
point.
In short, the point at issue between Kahn-Freund and the Bullock Committee
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majority seems not to be the report's incipient tendency to reification of 'the company's interests' but rather a conflict between Kahn-Freund's (implied) assumption
that profit maximization is the dominant objective of corporate activity and the
report's (implied) assumption that companies pursue a range of goals, of which
making profits is only one. On the former assumption it is perfectly easy to envisage employee directors being under "a conflict of duties which is simply insoluble"
for in a particular situation the maximization of profits may not further any
employee interest but must always seek to benefit in some way some or all shareholders. When a company may legally pursue a range of goals, attempting to hold a
balance among profit, growth, size, employment opportunities, etc., then no particular group interested in the company can claim permanent identification of the
company's interests with its interests. The crucial question becomes one of how the
balance is to be struck; that is the political/business decision that the board has to
make. It must not be forgotten that it is false to represent collective bargaining
itself as a process that reflects only a series of conflictual interests. The price paid
by trade unions for engaging in collective bargaining is the compromise and collaboration which goes into the making and the administration of the collective agreement. Indeed, the administration of the agreement may become more important on
occasion than the bargaining that preceded it. No doubt all this would be accepted
by those who prefer the 'pluralist' label. For this reason the term 'collective bargaining' has been criticized by some writers who see the process as one "which
would make joint regulation a much more appropriate term to indicate its essential
character" [721. A degree of responsibility for the collective agreement and its
administration has to be accepted by the trade union as well as by the employer.
The proposition that collective bargaining can be distinguished from all forms of
participation in the institutions of the enterprise, because the former rests upon a
basis of 'pluralism' or 'conflict' and the latter represents a degree of 'unitary' collaboration that suppresses the reality of conflict between labour and capital, is too simplistic to be upheld. Collective bargaining is one form of joint regulation. The
extent to which participation in the institutions of the enterprise causes workers
to integrate themselves into that enterprise depends upon the concrete terms of
their participation.

5. Conclusions
The Bullock proposals are clearly based upon a strategy of involvement of the
workers in corporate decision-making, but the report proposes both involvement
and a share in the exercise of power, so that it can be said to suggest a true form of
participation.The model of the report is the pluralistic one of bargaining between
employer and representatives of the employees who would be powerful and independent of both employers and the state, and for this reason alone it seems inappropriate to describe it as a form of corporatism [73]. There remains, however, the
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troublesome question of whether the model carries conviction, not in terms of
pluralism versus monism, but in terms of how the model would be likely to operate
in practice. In particular, the report probably does not say enough to convince those
who fear that the employee representatives will become, on the one hand, detached
from their 'base' in the employees on the shop floor and, on the other, incapable
(as part-time amateurs in the board-room) of exercising effective control over professional management [74].
In the writer's opinion these two groups of problems are not avoided by using traditional collective bargaining to extend joint regulation into the area of corporate
planning. The fundamental division within the British labour movement is perhaps
between those unions which have the self-confidence to wish to extend joint regulation - by whatever means - into this area and those which do not. For academic
students of the matters the debate has shown up the inadequacy of our theories
about and knowledge of union democracy and, even more so, how decisions in large
companies are made. If the report does no more than spur realistic investigation of
these-two topics, it will not have been in vain.

Postscript
The Government eventually responded to the Bullock Committee's proposals
in May 1978 in a White Paper, IndustrialDemocracy [75]. This document, while
accepting the Bullock analysis that "at company level there remains a major gap in
the development of the employee role" [76], in fact departs substantially from the
Committee's prescription.
First, much more stress is placed in the White Paper on the need for voluntary
agreements between employers and trade unions, so that legislation is explicitly
relegated to a fall-back role.
Second, although the need for legislation is accepted, employee representation
on the board no longer appears as the initial, or even primary, form of industrial
democracy. Instead, all companies employing more than 500 people in the U.K.
should be obliged "to discuss with the representatives of employees all major proposals affecting the employees of the business before decisions are made" [77]. In
the absence of contrary agreement, such discussion would take place outside the
boardroom but through a Joint Representation Committee of shop stewards of the
type proposed by the Bullock Committee. Only a very weak sanction is proposed
against companies that do not enter into voluntary agreements and do not comply
with the statutory fall-back obligation either. The sanction mentioned is compulsory, unilateral arbitration by the Central Arbitration Committee of the terms
and conditions of employment. This is the sanction used in the Employment Protection Act, 1975 where an employer refuses to negotiate with a union after having
been 'recommended' to do so by a government agency (the Advisory, Conciliation
and Arbitration Service) or where the employer refuses to disclose certain informa-
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tion for the purposes of collective bargaining. The sanction does not work terribly
well in those two contexts [78] and it is very difficult to imagine its successful
application in relation to discussions of corporate strategy.
Third, only after a period of three or four years' experience with discussion of
corporate strategy would there be any entitlement to employee representation on
the board. In the absence of contrary agreement, such representation would be on
the top or 'policy' board of a two-tier board structure in companies employing
more than 2,000 employees. This is a departure from the Bullock recommendations, but, as argued above, the crucial question is the range of functions allocated
to the policy board. The proposals in the White Paper appear to give the policy
board in general as much influence as the unitary board with 'attributed functions'
would have under the Bullock scheme. (An appendix to the White Paper spells out
in some detail the proposed relationship between the policy board and the 'management' board, which will normally consist only of senior executives, but it is less
clear on the relationship between the boards and the shareholders.) The proposals
are avowedly influenced more by the Danish than by the German model and they
would apply to all large private-sector companies, whether or not employees were
represented on the board.
The White Paper's major departure from the Bullock proposals consists, however, in its view that employee representation on the board by law should extend
to not more than one third of the seats in the first instance. This is a major rebuff
to the Committee because of the stress it laid upon the principle of parity representation. Whereas the Committee viewed parity representation as qualitatively different from minority representation, the White Paper regards one third as "a reasonable first step" [79]. The White Paper is also somewhat hesitant about the idea of
selecting the employee representatives exclusively through the JRC. It puts forward
as a possibility the granting of a role in the selection process to "any substantial
homogeneous group of employees" [80].
Somewhat surprisingly, the White Paper proposals were given a cautious welcome by the TUC, although the CBI maintains its opposition to any form of compulsion, even of a fall-back type. The unions affiliated to the TUC which supported
the Bullock proposals do not seem to find the watered-down version presented in
the White Paper acceptable, while those unions that opposed the Bullock proposals
do not find that the White Paper meets their differing, fundamental objections.
The Government is committed to laying proposals before Parliament in the
1978/79 Parliamentary session, but it seems unlikely that a Bill will be introduced
in time to secure passage before a general election intervenes, even if there is sufficient support in Parliament for the legislation, which is in any case doubtful. The
Government has introduced a separate Companies Bill, but this does not even contain the proposals for a two-tier board, which the White Paper viewed as offering
"certain advantages over a unitary board whether or not the employees are represented at board-level" [81 ]. The Bill does, however, require directors to have regard
to the interests of the employees and does contain a statutory statement of direc-
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tors duties, the two points on which the Government had committed itself in
advance of the White Paper onndustrialDemocracy [82].
The consequence of these various developments is that progress with employee
representation on the board is unlikely to be at all rapid in the private sector in the
near future and, for the reasons given above, it is the nationalised industries that are
likely to be the focus of immediate activity. The White Paper says: "Industrial
democracy is of special importance for the nationalised industries, and the Government intends that they should set an example to the private sector..." [83]. The
chairmen of all the nationalised industries have been asked to consult with the
recognised unions and to make joint proposals for further additions to the machinery for consultation and participation in those industries, which proposals may,
though need not, include employee representation on the board. In many cases
these proposals will be capable of implementation without legislation.
As a result of these initiatives there has been added to the Post Office scheme,
descfibed above, a scheme for representation on the main board of the British Steel
Corporation. The BSC scheme differs both from the Bullock proposals for the
private sector and from the Post Office arrangements. Like the Post Office the steel
arrangements are based upon selection of the representatives by the unions recognized nationally by the nationalised corporation but, unlike the Post Office, it was
agreed in the steel industry that the representatives should be full-time employees
of BSC rather than full-time union officials. In this respect the steel scheme is akin
to that proposed by the Bullock Committee, but the scheme gives the employees
only six out of the twenty-one main board seats. (There are six senior managers,
two civil servants, and seven 'independents'). The employee representatives are
formally appointed by the relevant government minister, but he accepts the unions'
nominations in full. More nationalised industry initiatives of differing sorts are
expected.
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